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Abstract
We analyze how termination charges affect retail prices when taking into account
that receivers derive some utility from a call and when firms may charge consumers for
receiving calls. A novel feature of our paper is that we consider passive self-fulfilling
expectations and do not allow for negative reception charges. Firms only charge for
receiving calls when the termination charge is below cost. We reconfirm the finding of
profit neutrality when firms cannot use termination-based price discrimination. When
firms can use termination-based price discrimination profits do depend on the termina-
tion charge. When the call externality is strong, firms prefer a below cost termination
charge and will use RPP. When the call externality is weak, firms prefer a termination
charge above cost. The termination charge that maximizes total welfare is below cost
and would induce an RPP regime.
Keywords: Bill and Keep; Call externality; Access Pricing; Interconnection; Re-
ceiver pays; Consumer Expectations
JEL classification: D43; K23; L51; L96
1 Introduction
Although the telecommunications sector has been liberalized in most industrialized countries,
some regulation remains. A clear example is call termination on mobile telephone networks.
Mobile operators must interconnect their networks so that their customers can communicate
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with the customers of other networks. This requires mobile operators to provide a wholesale
service called ‘call termination’, whereby each completes a call made to one of its subscribers
by a caller on another network. Call termination is provided in exchange for a fee.1 This fee,
also called mobile termination rate, is paid by the originating operator to the terminating
operator. Since the market for termination is monopolistic, one cannot rely on competition to
get termination rates at the efficient level. Excessive termination rates are believed to inflate
retail prices so that usage is inefficiently low. The European Commission has urged national
regulators to step in and regulate these termination rates towards the true cost. Most
countries around the world have followed suit and do regulate termination rates. Regulators
often use so called gliding paths which reduce termination rates gradually over a period of
several years. At present termination rates in most countries are still believed to be above
the cost of termination and regulators intend to reduce them further over the next years.
In May 2009, the European Commission recommended national regulatory authorities to
set termination rates based on the costs (i.e., the actual incremental cost of providing call
termination − without allowing for common costs) incurred by an efficient operator.2 The
European Commission’s view was also supported by the European regulators group, who
in the Common Position adopted on February 20083 decided to take a position in favor of
setting a unique and uniform termination rate for all network operators at the cost incurred
by an hypothetical efficient operator. As a result, the average MTR in Europe could drop
from about 8.55 euro cents per minute at the end of 2009, to approximately 2.5 euro cents per
minute by 2012 [see Harbord and Pagnozzi, 2010]. In light of these announcements, Vodafone
and other large European mobile operators warned the European Commission that cutting
termination rates could mean the end of handset subsidies for consumers and lead to a price
increase. Furthermore, Vodafone claimed that cutting termination rates could result in a US
style business model, where users pay for both placing and receiving calls.
The burden of regulation of termination rates is quite high. Any attempt by a national
regulator to lower termination charges has to be preceded by a formal investigation of the
relevant market and a round of public consultations. Operators oppose cuts in termination
rates and challenge any argument made by regulators. Often there are disputes about what
the true costs are, how they should be calculated and also about what the real effect of lower
termination charges is. In countries as the US and Canada, however, there seems to be no
1The fee is sometimes equal to zero. This arrangement is known as Bill and Keep.
2Commission Recommendation of 7 May 2009 on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termi-
nation Rates in the EU (2009/396/EC).
3See ”ERG’s Common Position on symmetry of fixed call termination rates and symmetry of mo-
bile call termination rates”, adopted by the ERG-Plenary on 28th February 2008, p. 4-5. Available at
http://www.erg.eu.int.
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need for regulators to set termination rates. In these countries the operators must negotiate
reciprocal termination rates between themselves and voluntarily agree to set them very low,
sometimes even at zero (that is, a Bill and Keep regime is chosen). Another major difference
between these countries and the European markets is that a so called Receiving Party Pays
(RPP) regime is used, while in Europe a Calling Party Pays (CPP) regime is in place. RPP
means that operators charge a price to their customers not only for placing calls but also one
for receiving calls. In this way operators can recover the cost of termination from their own
customers. Littlechild (2006) argues that RPP countries have lower usage prices and higher
usage than CPP countries, but higher fixed fees (or lower hand-set subsidies) and perhaps
lower penetration rates or at least slower growth in penetration rates. Dewenter and Kruse
(2010) argue that penetration rates in CPP and RPP countries are not significantly different
once one controls for endogenous regulation.
The seeming superiority of the RPP regime has lead some economists to call upon reg-
ulators in CPP countries to impose an RPP regime.4 However, the statistical evidence of
correlations between the payment regimes, termination charges, penetration, and retail prices
does not imply there is a specific causal relationship. In particular, it is not clear that using
an RPP regime will bring all the benefits that seem to be correlated with RPP regimes. In
fact, the CPP regime can be considered as a special case of RPP where consumers happen to
be charged a zero price for reception. Moreover, nothing prevents operators in RPP countries
without regulated termination rates to agree upon high termination charges. And even if
RPP were superior from a social welfare point of view, it would be difficult to imagine that
regulators could actually force firms to use such specific pricing structure. Only if it is in
the firms’ interest in terms of profitability, RPP regimes will be used. In our view, regula-
tors can at most influence the choice of firms between CPP and RPP by setting adequate
termination rates. However, inducing RPP regimes should not be the objective of regulators
per se. Regulators should set termination rates such that the resulting outcome in terms of
retail prices is socially efficient.
The objective of this paper is to explore the implications of termination rates for retail
pricing (including the choice of CPP or RPP), profits and efficiency when firms may charge
both outgoing and incoming calls. We consider a duopolistic framework in which firms,
located at the ends of a Hotelling line compete in non-linear prices. That is, firms set a
fixed fee, together with charges for placing and receiving calls. We do not allow firms to
set negative prices, although they are allowed to price below cost. This assumption alone
explains why CPP regimes are to be found in countries with high termination rates while
RPP regimes are only found in countries with low termination rates. Namely, if termination
4See for example. De Bijl et al. (2005).
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rates are above the cost of termination, firms would like to subsidize the reception of calls
(from rival networks) by setting negative prices. Once this possibility is excluded by our
assumption, the optimal thing to do is to charge the minimal price of zero for receiving calls.
That is, CPP is an endogenous outcome when termination rates are above cost. On the other
hand, when termination rates are below cost, firms do want to charge a strictly positive price
for the reception of calls. Hence, RPP will arise endogenously when termination rates are
set very low. This does not yet explain why operators in countries with high termination
rates consistently oppose reductions in these rates. Presumably they do this as they fear
their profits being reduced. Nevertheless, in countries with termination charges below cost
and RPP regimes, operators seem to be doing quite well. In fact, Average Revenue Per User
(ARPU) is usually higher in RPP countries (see Marcus (2004). The fact that operators in
some of these countries voluntarily agree on such arrangements should indicate that firms
can make reasonable returns on investment. In order to address the issue of what firms would
prefer and how regulators should intervene one needs to examine how profits and welfare
vary with different termination charges.
The impact of termination rates on competition, profit and welfare has been extensively
studied. This burgeoning literature starts with the seminal works of Armstrong (1998) and
Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a, b) (henceforth ALRT)5 Most of the theoretical work on
mobile network interconnection typically assumes that consumers derive utility only from
making calls, ignoring the existence of call externalities — that is, the fact that not only
callers but also receivers of a call enjoy a positive benefit.6 Clearly, if there is no utility
at all for receiving calls, consumers would refuse to answer the phone if they have to pay
a positive price for it, so that only the CPP regime makes sense. If termination charges
are above cost, firms do use CPP so that the results obtained in the literature assuming
CPP may be relevant also when call externalities exist and RPP is allowed. For example,
Laffont et al. (1998b) consider the case when networks compete in nonlinear prices and can
charge different price for on- and off-net calls. They show that profit is strictly decreasing in
termination charge. Building on their analysis, Gans and King (2001) show that firms using
a CPP regime strictly prefer below cost termination charges. The intuition for their results is
that if termination charge is above cost, off-net calls will be more expensive than on-net calls.
5For a complete review of the literature on access charges see Armstrong (2002), Vogelsang (2003) and
Peitz et al. (2004).
6One assumption that is invoked to justify the absence of call externalities in models of network com-
petition is that call externalities could be largely internalized by the parties (see Competition Commission
[2003, paras 8.257 to 8.260]). However, as argued by Hermalin and Katz (2004, p. 424), ”this assumption is
applicable only to a limited set of situations in which either the communicating parties behave altruistically
or have a repeated relationship”. Additionally, Harbord and Pagnozzi [2010] argue that the empirical basis
for the internalization of call externalities is unclear.
4
As there is a price differential between on- and off-net calls, consumers care about the size
of each network (the so-called ‘tariff-mediated network externalities’). In particular, they
will be more eager to join the larger network. Consequently, acquisition costs are reduced,
which in turn intensifies competition for subscribers and results in lower subscription fees
and profits. Firms would thus prefer termination charges below cost. As total welfare would
be maximized by termination charges equal to cost, this implies that consumers are better off
when termination charges are strictly above cost. Berger (2005) considers the same setting
where firms again use CPP but where call externalities do exist. In this case the social
welfare maximizing termination charge is shown to be below cost. Berger (2005) argues
that regulation is not necessary as the preferences of firms and regulators are aligned. As a
matter of fact, these results are at odds with real world observations since regulators around
the world, and especially in the European Union, are concerned about too high termination
charges and operators consistently oppose cutting termination rates. 7
The possibility that the receiving party enjoys benefits from a call is clearly important for
the manner in which firms compete in the retail market. Once it is recognized that consumers
enjoy benefits from receiving a call, it follows that they are prepared to pay for this. Indeed,
in some countries (e.g. Canada, Singapore, Hong Kong and the United States) mobile
operators charge their subscribers for the calls they receive.8 An incipient literature has
started to examine the relationship between termination rates and equilibrium prices in an
environment with call externalities and RPP regimes. Laffont et al. (2003; LMRT hereafter),
Jeon et al. (2004; JLT hereafter), Hermalin and Katz (2006), Cambini and Valletti (2008) and
Lo´pez (2010) are the papers closest to ours.9 LMRT analyze Internet backbone competition
and assume that there exist two types of users: websites (senders) and consumers (receivers).
Hermalin and Katz study whether termination charges can induce carriers to internalize the
externalities that arise when both senders and receivers of telecommunications messages
enjoy benefits. But in contrast to the framework of LMRT, in which there are two different
types of users, they consider that any given user has a one-half chance of being a sender and
a one-half chance of being a receiver. In JLT, Lo´pez (2010)10, and this paper, however, every
7Nevertheless, this result has been shown to be very robust. For example, it holds for any number of
networks [Calzada and Valletti, 2008] and when networks are asymmetric [Lo´pez and Rey, 2009]. Also,
Hurkens and Jeon (2009) show that this result holds when there are both network externalities (i.e., elastic
subscription demand as in Dessein, 2003) and network-based price discrimination.
8According to Dewenter and Kruse (2010) 14 countries used RPP from the beginning at least until 2003.
Another 31 countries started with RPP but switched at some point to CPP.
9Other related papers in this literature include Kim and Lim (2001); DeGraba (2003); Hahn (2003);
Berger (2004, 2005); Hermalin and Katz (2001, 2004)).
10Lo´pez (2010) generalizes the framework of JLT by allowing a random noise in both the callers’ and
receivers’ utilities, by removing (at some stages) the assumption of a given proportionality between the utility
functions, and by allowing asymmetry between mobile operators with respect to the number of locked-in
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consumer both sends and receives traffic, and moreover obtains surplus from and is charged
for placing and receiving calls. JLT and Lo´pez (2010) obtain the following results. On the
one hand, in the absence of network-based price discrimination, mobile operators charge
calls and call receptions at their off-net cost.11. Hence operators charge a positive price for
incoming calls only when the termination charge is below cost (so as to recover the cost of
providing the service of call termination).12 When termination charge is above cost operators
will set negative prices and subsidize incoming calls in order to earn termination profits. On
the other hand, when mobile operators can differentiate their calling and reception charges
according to whether the communication is on- or off-net, connectivity is prone to break
down. The reason is that off-net calling and reception charges allow network operators to
create direct externalities on the customers of rival operators. If, for example, the callers
obtain more utility than the receivers from a given call, the attractiveness of the offer of
the network where the call is received will be reduced in comparison with the rival’s offer.
Therefore, to avoid a loss of attractiveness, the terminating network will break connectivity
by charging a prohibitively high reception price.
In the present paper we develop further the analysis of JLT and obtain new results
that have implications for retail pricing. The main novelty of our analysis lies in studying
how consumer expectations affect equilibrium end-user prices (and so equilibrium profit
and welfare). We introduce this novelty because we have shown elsewhere that consumer
expectations are crucial under CPP regimes. A further difference with the related literature
mentioned is that we impose that prices cannot be negative. In particular, subsidizing the
reception of calls is not allowed in our paper. Furthermore, acknowledging the existence
of equilibria with connectivity breakdown, we focus on the equilibria in which there is no
connectivity breakdown. In particular, we show how the termination charge affects the
existence of such equilibria and the private and social benefits obtained in these equilibria.
In Hurkens and Lo´pez (2010) we show that the way consumers form expectations about
network sizes is crucial for the relationship between termination charges and equilibrium
profit under the CPP regime. We observe that the intuition for the counter-intuitive results
obtained by Laffont et al. (1998b), Gans and King (2001) and Berger (2005) relies on the
assumption that consumers can correctly predict the size of each network, after any combi-
nation of prices. Consumers having such rationally responsive expectations means that any
change of a price, how tiny it may be, by one firm is assumed to lead to an instantaneous ra-
customers.
11This so called “off-net-cost pricing principle” dates back to LMRT, who found this pricing rule in a
framework for Internet backbone competition.
12Cambini and Valletti (2008) obtain the same result in their framework of information exchange between
calling parties with interdependency among outgoing and incoming calls.
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tional change in expectations of all consumers, such that, given these changed expectations,
optimal subscription decisions will lead realized and expected network sizes to coincide. So
a unilateral change in price does not lead only to a change in market shares, but it also leads
consumers to accurately predict how market shares will change. We propose to relax the
assumption of rationally responsive expectations and to replace it by one of fulfilled equilib-
rium expectations. This concept was first introduced by Katz and Shapiro (1985). Basically,
Katz and Shapiro (1985) assume that first consumers form expectations about network sizes,
then firms compete, and finally consumers make optimal subscription or purchasing deci-
sions, given the expectations. These decisions then lead to actual market shares and network
sizes. Katz and Shapiro impose that, in equilibrium, realized and expected network sizes are
the same. We will refer to such expectations throughout the paper as passive (self-fulfilled)
expectations. They are passive as they do not respond to out of equilibrium deviations by
firms. Hurkens and Lo´pez (2010) show that this seemingly innocuous twist of the model-
ing of consumer expectations is able to reconcile the puzzle: When consumers have passive
expectations, firms prefer termination charges above cost, and socially optimal termination
charges are below or at cost (depending on the case that is under consideration).13
It is worth mentioning that a few recent papers also attempt to reconcile the mentioned
puzzle. Armstrong and Wright (2009)14, Jullien, Rey and Sand-Zantman (2010)15, and
Hoernig, Inderst and Valletti (2009)16 have in common that they introduce additional re-
alistic features of the telecommunication industry into the Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998b)
framework. They show that for some parameter range (and under rationally responsive
expectations) joint profits increase as the termination charge increases above the cost. How-
ever, contrary to Hurkens and Lo´pez (2010) these papers conclude that the need to regulate
termination charges is reduced because the socially optimal termination charge would also
be above cost.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the general model based on JLT
and defines the concept of passive expectations. We assume that the utility of receiving
calls is proportional but smaller than the utility from placing calls. In section 3 we examine
13Moreover, this result is robust to the inclusion of call externalities, an arbitrary number of mobile
operators, asymmetric networks and elastic subscription demand.
14Armstrong and Wright (2009) argue that if MTM and FTM termination charges must be chosen uni-
formly, as is in fact the case in most European countries, firms will trade off desirable high FTM and desirable
low MTM charges and arrive at some intermediate level, which may well be above cost.
15Jullien, Rey and Sand-Zantman (2010) argue that the willingness to pay for subscription is related to
the volume of calls. They introduce two types of users in the framework of ALRT: light users and heavy
users. Light users only receive calls and are assumed to have an elastic subscription demand. Instead, full
participation is assumed for heavy users, who can place calls and obtain a fixed utility from receiving calls.
16Hoernig, Inderst and Valletti (2009) consider the existence of calling clubs so that the calling pattern is
not uniform but skewed.
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the case of no network-based price discrimination. We first describe the set of equilibria
when the volume of calls is always determined by the same party (either caller or receiver).
By introducing noise in the marginal utility of receivers both parties jointly determine the
volume and a unique equilibrium exists. Focussing on this unique equilibrium, we observe
that the off-net-cost pricing principle is robust to the way consumers form expectations about
network sizes. The reason is that mobile operators set marginal prices at the opportunity
cost of ‘stealing’ the customers away from the rival operators (this maximizes consumer
surplus, which can then be extracted through the fixed fee). As marginal prices do not
depend on market shares, consumer expectations do not alter them. This result has two
implications. First, in equilibrium profit is neutral to the level of the termination charge.
Second, mobile operators only charge for incoming calls when the termination charge is
below cost. The analysis concludes by determining the socially optimal prices: As optimality
requires a positive reception charge, optimal termination charge must be strictly below cost.
We also consider an alternative way to select a unique equilibrium, without relying on noisy
utilities. We simply assume that operators must set the same price for placing and receiving
calls. This does not affect the profit neutrality result but is does explain the widely used
bucket plans of operators in the US where consumers pay a fixed fee and a low price per
minute of use, independent on the direction of traffic.
Section 4 considers the case of network-based price discrimination. Again, we describe
the set of equilibria when there is no noise in the utilities. After introducing vanishing noise,
we focus on the possible existence of an equilibrium without connectivity breakdown. As
long as the termination charge is not too low (such as Bill and Keep), such equilibrium
exists. Profit is no longer neutral with respect to the termination charge. The termination
rate that maximizes firms’ profits depends on the strength of the call externality. If the
externality is strong, firms prefer a termination charge below cost and will set positive prices
for receiving calls. On the other hand, if the externality is weak, firms prefer a termination
charge above cost. The resulting off-net call price will be equal to the monopoly price in
this case. Moreover, firms will not charge for receiving off-net calls. We also show that the
lowest termination charge that allows the existence of an equilibrium without connectivity
breakdown is the one that maximizes total welfare. For this socially optimal termination
charge it happens to be that firms would earn higher profits if they would commit to a CPP
regime. Section 5 concludes. The technical appendix presents some useful derivatives needed
to follow the analysis of the paper.
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2 The model
We consider the framework developed by JLT (2004), which extends the traditional frame-
work of network competition by allowing receivers to obtain utility from receiving calls and
firms to charge call receptions.
There are two network operators, i = 1, 2, each providing full coverage.
Cost structure. The fixed cost to serve each subscriber is f , whereas cO and cT denote
the marginal cost of providing a telephone call borne by the originating and terminating
networks. The marginal cost of an on-net call is then c ≡ cO + cT . Network operators pay
each other a reciprocal access charge a when a call initiated on a network is terminated on
a different network.17 The termination mark-up is equal to:
m ≡ a− cT .
The perceived cost of calls is the true cost c for on-net calls, augmented by the termination
mark-up for the off-net calls cO + a = c + m for the caller’s network. The marginal cost of
an off-net call is cT − a = −m for the receiver’s network.
Retail pricing. We consider competition in nonlinear pricing under two different frame-
works. First, we consider competition in the absence of network-based (i.e., on-net/off-net)
price discrimination (Section 3). Here we examine two scenarios: when network i offers
three-part tariffs {Fi, pi, ri}, where Fi is the monthly subscriber charge, pi is the per-unit
calling price and ri is the per-unit reception charge, and when network i sets the same price
for outgoing and incoming calls {Fi, pi, pi}, where pi is the per-unit calling and reception
charge. Secondly, we consider competition in the presence of network-based discrimination
(Section 4): Network i offers five-part tariffs of the form: {Fi, pi, p̂i, ri, r̂i}, where p̂i and r̂i
denote the off-net calling and reception charges.
Market shares. The networks (i.e., firms) sell a differentiated but substitutable prod-
uct. Consumers are uniformly distributed on the segment [0, 1] and the two networks are
located at the two extremities of the segment (x1 = 0, x2 = 1). Given income y, a consumer
located at x and joining network i has utility
y + v0 − t |x− xi|+ wi,
where v0 represents a fixed surplus from being connected to either network (it is assumed
to be large enough so that all consumers want to subscribe to one network), t |x− xi| is the
17Reciprocity means that a network pays as much for termination of a call on the rival network as it
receives for completing a call originated on the rival network.
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cost of subscribing to a network with ”address” xi, and wi is the net surplus of a network-i
consumer from making and receiving calls on that network. Network 1’s market share is
given by
α1 =
1
2
+ σ(w1 − w2), (1)
where σ ≡ 1/2t measures the degree of substitutability between the two networks. As there
is full participation, 2’s market share is α2 = 1− α1.
Individual demand. Subscribers obtain positive utility from making and receiving calls.
The caller’s utility from making a call of length q minutes is u(q), whereas the receiver’s is
u˜(q) from receiving a call of that length. u(·) and u˜(·) are twice continuously differentiable,
and concave. For tractability, we assume that
u˜(q) = βu(q) with 0 < β < 1.
We consider the case in which callers and receivers can hang up.
Volume of calls without noise. In equilibrium two cases may arise depending on whether
the caller or the receiver determines the volume. When the caller hangs up first, the length
of a call from network i to network j is given by D(pi, rj) = q(pi) for i, j = 1, 2. Conversely,
when the receiver determines the volume: D(pi, rj) = q(
rj
β
) for i, j = 1, 2. As we argue
below, under this specification there is a range of equilibria. By letting the marginal utilities
of communications be random we can single out one equilibrium. Thus, we will also examine
the case with noise, where individual demand is defined as follows.
Volume of calls with noise. The utility that a receiver derives from receiving a call is
subject to a noise ε18:
u˜(q) + εq.
ε follows the distribution function F (·), with wide enough support [ε, ε], zero mean, and
density function f(·), which is strictly positive for all ε in the support. Additionally, ε is
identically and independently distributed for each caller-receiver pair.
As receivers are allowed to hang up, for a given pair of prices (pi, rj) the length of a
call from a caller of network i to a receiver of network j is given by q(max(pi, (rj − ε)/β)).
Therefore, the volume of calls from network i to network j is αiαjD(pi, rj) with
D(pi, rj) ≡ [1− F (rj − βpi)]q(pi) +
∫ rj−βpi
ε
q
(
rj − ε
β
)
f(ε)dε.
Similarly, the utility that a network-i consumer obtains from placing calls to network-j
18Introducing also noise in the marginal utility of the caller will not change the results.
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consumers is αjU(pi, rj) with
U(pi, rj) ≡ [1− F (rj − βpi)]u(q(pi)) +
∫ rj−βpi
ε
u
(
q
(
rj − ε
β
))
f(ε)dε.
Notice that
∂U(pi, rj)
∂pi
= pi
∂D(pi, rj)
∂pi
. (2)
The utility that a network-j consumer obtains from receiving calls from network-i consumers
is αiU˜(pi, rj) with
U˜(pi, rj) ≡
∫ ε
rj−βpi
[u˜(q(pi)) + εq(pi)] f(ε)dε
+
∫ rj−βpi
ε
[
u˜
(
q
(
rj − ε
β
))
+ εq
(
rj − ε
β
)]
f(ε)dε.
And,
∂U˜(pi, rj)
∂rj
= rj
∂D(pi, rj)
∂rj
. (3)
We make the standard assumption of a balanced calling pattern, which means that the
percentage of calls originating on a given network and completed on another given (including
the same) network is equal to the fraction of consumers subscribing to the terminating
network.19
Timing. We assume that the terms of interconnection are negotiated or established by
a regulator first. Then, for a given access charge a (or equivalently, a given m) the timing
of the game is the following:
1. Consumers form expectations about the number of subscribers of each network i
(βi) with β1 ≥ 0, β2 ≥ 0 and β1 + β2 = 1.
2. Firms take these expectations as given and choose simultaneously retail tariffs: i) in
the absence of network-based price discrimination: Ti = (Fi, pi, ri) for i = 1, 2; ii) in
the presence of network-based price discrimination: Ti = (Fi, pi, p̂i, ri, r̂i) for i = 1, 2.
3. Consumers make rational subscription and consumption decisions, given their expec-
tations and given the networks’ tariffs.
Therefore, market share αi is a function of prices and consumer expectations. Self-
fulfilling expectations imply that at equilibrium βi = αi.
19Dessein (2003, 2004) examines how unbalanced calling patterns between different customer types affect
retail competition when network operators compete in the presence of the caller-pays regime.
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3 No Network-Based Price Discrimination
While in many European countries on-net/off-net price discrimination is a common practice,
there are countries as for example the US where this is less common.20 In addition, in mobile
telecommunications markets, it is not uncommon for firms to offer price plans in which both
regimes (network-based and no network-based price discrimination) coexist. In this section,
we consider for a given reciprocal access charge a and consumer expectations β1 and β2,
competition under the receiver-pays regime and no network-based price discrimination. We
first analyze price competition when networks offer different prices for outgoing and incoming
calls (what we term ”party-based price discrimination”). We then analyze the case in which
networks set the same price for placing and receiving calls. The analysis of the latter case is
partially motivated by the observation that in some countries where the receiver-pays regime
is used, network operators offer a volume of minutes in a exchange for a fee independently
of whether the user is placing or receiving an on- or off-net call. Notice that setting pi = ri
resembles a tariff whereby firms allow consumers to make and receive a volume of q(pi/β)
minutes and charge them pi per minute of use.
Before turning to the analysis of these two cases, though, we examine price competition
in the absence of noise. We show that there exists a range of equilibria, and argue that either
the case of party-based price discrimination with noise or price competition with pi = ri, are
only criteria to select one equilibrium in the range of the feasible equilibria.
3.1 Deterministic utility and party-based price discrimination
In the absence of noise in the marginal utilities, as Jeon et al. (2004) point out, there exists
a potential indeterminacy of equilibria. If the caller determines the volume, then as the
reception charge has no impact on volume, from the viewpoint of firms and subscribers only
the sum {Fi + riq} matters, not its composition. Similarly, when the volume is determined
by the receiver, only the sum {Fi + piq}, and not its composition, matters. However, both
call and reception charges matter in both cases. In what follows we construct the range
of equilibria for both cases. The idea is to show that the assumptions we make next are
only criteria that allow us to select one of these equilibria. We will also show that in any
symmetric equilibrium, profit is neutral to the access charge.
First, assume that callers determine the volume, in equilibrium it must hold that r ≤ βp.
Given the balanced calling pattern assumption and consumer expectations β1 and β2, the
surplus from subscribing to network i (gross of transportation costs) is given by (for i 6= j =
20In the case of the US there is a technical reason: as the prefixes of mobile and fixed line numbers are
not different, it is difficult for users to identify to which network the person being called belongs to.
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1, 2):
wi = ϕi (βi, pi, pj)− Fi
with
ϕi (βi, pi, pj) = u(q(pi))− piq(pi) + βiu˜(q(pi)) + βju˜(q(pj))− ri(βiq(pi) + βjq(pj)).
Since consumers’ expectations are assumed passive we have that wi is a function of
expectations and prices, instead of market shares and prices as it is in the case of rationally
responsive expectations. The profit of network i is
pii = αi [(pi − c− αjm) q(pi) + αjmq(pj) + ri(αiq(pi) + αjq(pj)) + Fi − f ] .
Adjusting Fi so as to maintain net surpluses w1 and w2 and thus market shares constant,
leads network i to set pi so as to maximize (for i 6= j = 1, 2):
pii = [αi (pi − c− αjm) q(pi) + αjmq(pj) + ri(αiq(pi) + αjq(pj))
+ϕi (βi, pi, pj)− ϕj
(
βj, pj, pi
)
+ Fj − 1
σ
(αi − 1
2
)− f ].
The first-order condition yields
pi = c+ αjm− βirj. (4)
Observe that the optimal call price depends on the reception charge (of the rival). As the
caller determines the volume, firms set the calling price at the perceived (or, as termed by
JLT, ”strategic marginal”) cost of placing a call, which is given by: the average marginal
cost of a call c+αjm minus the pecuniary externality imposed on the subscribers of the rival
network βirj.
21 In a symmetric equilibrium (α1 = α2 = 1/2) under symmetric reception
charges ri = rj = r
∗, Eq. (4) boils down to
p∗ = c+
m− r∗
2
. (5)
21A decrease in pi will increase the volume of calls from network i to network j. This in turn increases
the surplus of network-j subscribers from the calls they receive from network i (direct externality), but also
their payment as they have to pay for receiving these extra calls (pecuniary externality). Since the direct
externality on i and j’s subscribers is the same (the volume of calls received by consumers increases by the
same amount independently of the network they are attached), only the pecuniary externality matters.
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Assume that pi = pj = p, then i’s profit can be rewritten as follows
pii = αi [(p− c) q(p) + riq(p) + Fi − f ] (6)
with αi =
1
2
+ σ (ϕ (βi, p, p)− Fi − ϕ (βi, p, p) + Fj). Using ∂αi/∂Fi = −σ, we have
dpii
dFi
= −σ [(p− c) q(p) + riq(p) + Fi − f ] + αi.
At symmetric equilibrium
F ∗ + r∗q(p∗) = f +
1
2σ
− (p∗ − c)q(p∗). (7)
As hinted above, any combination (F ∗, p∗, r∗) satisfying Eqs. (5) and (7) is an equilibrium
(provided that r∗ ≤ βp∗ and that no firm wants to deviate and set the reception charge
above βp∗). By replacing Eqs. (5) and (7) into (6), we have that at symmetric equilibrium:
pi = 1
4σ
. That is, equilibrium profit is neutral to the access charge and equals the profit that
firms would obtain under unit demand.
We now turn to the case in which receivers determine the volume. In equilibrium the con-
dition r ≥ βp must hold. The surplus from subscribing to network i (gross of transportation
costs) is now given by (for i 6= j = 1, 2):
wi = u˜(q(
ri
β
))− ri(q(ri
β
)) + βiu(q(
ri
β
)) + βju(q(
rj
β
))− pi(βiq(
ri
β
) + βjq(
rj
β
))− Fi.
Maximizing pii with respect to ri while adjusting Fi to keep the relative attractiveness (wi−
wj) of the two networks, yields the following first-order condition:
ri = αic− αjm− βipj. (8)
Note that the optimal reception charge depends on the call price chosen by the rival. When
the receiver determines the volume, firm i sets the reception charge at the perceived (or
strategic marginal cost) of receiving a call, which is given by: the average unit cost of
receiving calls on a given network αic − αjm minus the pecuniary externality imposed on
the subscribers of the rival network αip. At symmetric equilibrium, Eq. (8) reads as
r∗ =
c− (m+ p∗)
2
.
As above, it is straightforward to show that at the symmetric equilibrium the first-order
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condition with respect to Fi is given by
F ∗ + p∗q(
r∗
β
) = f +
1
2σ
− (r∗ − c) q(r
∗
β
). (9)
Any combination (F ∗, p∗, r∗) satisfying Eqs. (8) and (9) is an equilibrium (provided that
r∗ ≥ βp∗ and that no firm has an incentive to deviate and set call price so high that all
volume is determined by the caller). As in the previous case, equilibrium profit equals 1
4σ
.
3.2 Deterministic utility and no party-based price discrimination
Here we assume that networks charge a fixed fee and set the same per-unit price p for
outgoing and incoming calls. We also assume that there is no noise. Notice that β < 1
implies that at (symmetric) equilibrium the volume is always determined by the receiver.
Therefore, we have that D(pi, pj) = q
(
pj
β
)
for i, j = 1, 2. The surplus from subscribing to
network i (gross of transportation costs) is then given by
wi = βiu(q(
pi
β
)) + βju(q(
pj
β
)) + u˜(q(
pi
β
))− pi[βiq(
pi
β
) + βjq(
pj
β
)]− piq(pi
β
).
The profit of network i is (for i 6= j = 1, 2):
pii = αi[αi(pi − c)q(pi
β
) + αj(pi − c−m)q(pj
β
) + αjmq(
pi
β
) + piq(
pi
β
) + Fi − f ]. (10)
Let p∗ denote the symmetric equilibrium usage price. The next proposition characterizes the
equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (no party-based price discrimination). When m < c, there exists a unique
symmetric equilibrium, in which firms set p∗ = c−m
3
and F ∗ = f+ 1
2σ
−(2p∗−c)D(p∗, p∗). The
symmetric equilibrium profit is independent of the access charge and given by pi1 = pi2 = 1/4σ.
To understand why firms charge p∗ = c−m
3
, note that when the receiver is who determines
the volume, firm i sets the usage price at the perceived or strategic marginal cost of receiving
a call, which is given by: the average unit cost of receiving calls on a given network (αic−αjm)
minus the pecuniary externality imposed on the subscribers of the rival network αip
22 (i.e.,
22A decrease in ri will increase the volume of calls from network j to network i. This in turn increases the
surplus of network-j subscribers from the calls they place on network i (direct externality), but also their
payment as they have to pay for placing these extra calls (pecuniary externality). Since the direct externality
on i and j’s subscribers is the same (the volume of calls placed by consumers increases by the same amount
independently of the network they are attached), only the pecuniary externality matters.
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Eq. (8)). Since we are imposing that p = r, it follows that at the symmetric equilibrium
p = p∗.
We observe that profits are neutral to the access charge as in the case of competition
in two-part tariffs under the caller-pays regime (Laffont et al. 1998a). In the latter case,
an increase in the access charge boosts usage prices (as they are set equal to the average
marginal cost of a call), which in turn increases the per-user profit or, in other words, reduces
the opportunity cost of servicing a customer. This makes it more attractive to build market
share and thus intensifies competition for subscribers, resulting in lower fixed fees. In our
setting an analogous relationship exists, though in the opposite direction. Here an increase
in the access charge, decreases the usage price. This reduces the per-user profit and makes
it less attractive to attract subscribers, resulting in higher fixed fees.23 As there is full
participation of subscribers, in both cases the pass-through rates of cost into prices is one-
to-one24, thus the two opposite effects cancel and the impact of the access charge on profit
is totally neutralized (100% waterbed effect).
Turning now to the socially efficient price, note that it must satisfy the condition u′(q) +
u˜′(q) = c. Hence the socially efficient price equals c
1+β
. We have the following,
Proposition 2 (social optimum). (i) The socially efficient termination mark-up is given
by m = m∗ ≡ c (1−2β)
1+β
. Thus m∗ > (<)0 when call externalities are week (strong) so that
β < (>)1
2
. (ii) Under cost-based access charges (m = 0), the volume of calls is socially
excessive only if β > 1
2
. (iii) Under bill-and-keep (m = − c
2
), the volume of calls is socially
insufficient.
Proof. For m = 0, users will place q( c
3β
) calls. The volume of calls is socially excessive if
c
3β
< c
1+β
, which holds for β > 1
2
. Under bill-and-keep, users will place q( c
2β
) calls. This
volume of calls is socially insufficient since c
2β
> c
1+β
. Finally, p∗ = c
1+β
for m = m∗.
3.3 Random utility and party-based price discrimination
Network i offers the three-part tariff {Fi, pi, ri}. Given the balanced calling pattern assump-
tion and consumer expectations β1 and β2, the surplus from subscribing to network i (gross
of transportation costs) is given by (for i 6= j = 1, 2):
wi = φi(βi, pi, ri, pj, rj)− Fi
23This is true whenever m > −c. If m is too negative, then increasing the access charge could increase the
per-user profit, leading to lower fixed fees.
24As the market is assumed to be covered, the equilibrium mark-up is independent of the cost per sub-
scriber, implying that there is a 100% pass-through (see Jullien and Rey, 2008).
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with
φi(βi, pi, ri, pj, rj) = βiU(pi, ri) + βjU(pi, rj) + βiU˜(pi, ri) + βjU˜(pj, ri)
−pi
[
βiD(pi, ri) + βjD(pi, rj)
]− ri [βiD(pi, ri) + βjD(pj, ri)] .
The profit of network i can be written as
pii = αi[αi(pi − c)D(pi, ri) + αj(pi − c−m)D(pi, rj) + αjmD(pj, ri) (11)
+ri(αiD(pi, ri) + αjD(pj, ri)) + Fi − f ].
Adjusting Fi so as to maintain net surpluses w1 and w2 and thus market shares constant,
leads network i to set pi and ri so as to maximize
pii = αi[αi(pi − c)D(pi, ri) + αj(pi − c−m)D(pi, rj) + αjmD(pj, ri) (12)
+ri(αiD(pi, ri) + αjD(pj, ri)) + φi(βi, pi, ri, pj, rj)− φj(βj, pj, rj, pi, ri)
+Fj − 1
σ
(αi − 1
2
)− f ].
Assume that ri = rj = r, by differentiating (12) with respect to pi and using (2), we obtain
the following first-order condition:
pi = c+ αjm− αir. (13)
Similarly, assuming pi = pj = p, and by differentiating (12) with respect to ri and using (3),
we obtain the following first-order condition:
ri = αic− αjm− αip. (14)
If pi = p and ri = r, equations (13) and (14) simplify to
p = c+m, (15)
r = −m. (16)
In equilibrium p and r do not depend on market shares, and network operators charge calls
and call receptions at their off-net cost. This is the so-called ‘off-net-cost pricing principle’25:
Each network sets prices for a subscriber’s outgoing and incoming traffic at the marginal cost
25The off-net-cost pricing principle dates back to Laffont et al. (2003), who found this pricing rule in a
framework for Internet backbone competition.
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that it would incur if all other subscribers belonged to the rival network. To understand this
result, notice that the off-net cost is also the opportunity cost of stealing the customers away
from the rival network.26 As usual with two-part tariffs, firms set the marginal price(s) at
marginal cost so as to maximize the consumer surplus, which can then be extracted through
the fixed part. JLT and Lo´pez (2010) also find this pricing rule under the assumption of
rationally responsive expectations. Therefore the off-net-cost pricing principle is robust to
the assumption of consumer expectations. The reason is that firms set marginal prices at
the opportunity cost of stealing the customers away from the rivals, and so marginal prices
do not depend on market shares. The way consumers form expectations is then irrelevant
for the level of the equilibrium marginal prices.
By setting calling and reception charges at the off-net cost, we have that αi =
1
2
−
σ (Fi − Fj) (for i 6= j = 1, 2). At equilibrium, market shares do not depend on expectations
because there is full participation and, as commented above, usage prices are independent
of market shares and symmetric. Thus, i’s profit can be rewritten as follows:
pii =
(
1
2
− σ(Fi − Fj)
)
(Fi − f). (17)
Solving the first-order conditions, we obtain the equilibrium fixed fees Fi = f +
1
2σ
. The
equilibrium profit is therefore pii =
1
4σ
, which is the profit that each network would obtain
under unit demands. We also have that at equilibrium, profits are independent of the level
of the access charge. As Lo´pez (2010) points out, the reason is that all call activities yield
zero profit: on-net calls cost (per unit) c and yield revenue (per unit) p+ r = c, originating
an off-net call costs cO + a while it yields revenue p = c + m = cO + a, and the cost of
terminating an off-net call is cO while it yields revenue a+ r = a−m = cO.
If reception charges are restricted to be non-negative, the above analysis is only correct
for m ≤ 0, that is, for termination charges below the cost of termination. Suppose m > 0
and reception charges cannot be negative. Then it will be optimal to set reception charges
at the minimum, i.e., r1 = r2 = r = 0. Hence, if termination charges are above cost, firms
will not charge consumers for the reception of calls, even if they are allowed to do so. And
the optimal call price will then be p1 = p2 = p = c +
m
2
. In this case, call charges are again
set at average marginal cost, but reception is “charged” (at zero) above the true cost of
termination −m < 0. Firms now do make profits from traffic, in particular from terminating
calls. Given the symmetry in call and reception charges, market share is again given by
26The opportunity cost of stealing a caller away from the rival network is cO + a = c + m, whereas the
opportunity cost of stealing a receiver away from the rival network is cO − a = −m. See Lo´pez (2010) for a
complete characterization of the off-net-cost pricing equilibrium.
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αi =
1
2
− σ(Fi − Fj). Hence, firms choose the fixed fee so as to maximize
pii = αi(mq(p) + Fi − f) (18)
The first-order condition for a symmetric equilibrium now reads
0 = −σ(mq(p) + F − f) + 1
2
so that F = f + 1
2σ
− mq(p) and equilibrium profit equals, again, 1/(4σ).27 We have the
following,
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium) (i) if −
(
β
1+β
)
c < m < 0, then as the noise vanishes there
exists a unique symmetric equilibrium where marginal prices are set at the off-net cost (p =
c+m and r = −m), F = f + 1
2σ
and profit is neutral to the termination charge: pi = 1
4σ
; (ii)
if m ≥ 0 and reception charges cannot be negative, then (for σ and m not too high) there
exists a unique equilibrium in which p = c + m
2
, r = 0, F = f + 1
2σ
−mq(c + m
2
) and profit
is neutral to the termination charge: pi = 1
4σ
.
The profit neutrality result is independent of the exact specification of the randomness
in the marginal utility for receivers. In particular, it holds even if noise does not vanish.
It is straightforward to show that the socially optimal call and reception prices converge to
(p∗, r∗) = ( c
1+β
, βc
1+β
) as the noise vanishes. The intuition is that efficiency requires that the
volume of calls q satisfies u′(q) + u˜′(q) − c = 0. Notice that optimality requires a positive
reception charge and therefore m must be strictly negative. In fact, the socially optimal
reception charge will be
m∗ =
−βc
1 + β
.
Figure 1 illustrates the sets of equilibria when utility is deterministic for a specific value
of m ∈ (−βc/(β + 1), 0). They are indicated by the two thick parts. Point X indicates
the intersection of both first-order condition equations. This point is the equilibrium when
utility is random, so that sometimes the caller and sometimes the receiver determines the
volume of calls. Finally, the point Y indicates the possibility of an equilibrium where firms
restrict themselves to charge the same price for placing and receiving calls. This practice
may be chosen as it is perhaps easier to market to consumers. In any case, as we have shown
above, at any equilibrium, profit is neutral to the access charge. This is caused by the full
27This equilibrium exists and is unique when σ or m are not too high (see proof of Proposition 7 in Laffont
et al. [1998a, Appendix B]).
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coverage assumption of the Hotelling model and the impossibility to discriminate between
on- and off-net calls.
-
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Figure 1: Equilibria with random or deterministic utility.
4 Network-based price discrimination
In this section we allow the firms to set a fixed fee and (non-negative) prices for making
and receiving calls that can depend on the network receiving and originating the call. That
is, firm i chooses (Fi, pi, ri, pˆi, rˆi). We use the same set-up as in JLT (2004), except for the
fact that we do not allow for negative reception charges and that we assume that consumers
form expectations in a passive way. We will again assume that there is randomness in the
marginal utility of receivers. For technical reasons we assume that noise vanishes in the
following regular way (similar to the definition in JLT):
Definition 4 A sequence of distributions Fn(ε) with zero mean on domain [ε, ε¯] is called
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regular if for any continuous function h(·) we have
lim
n→∞
E[h(ε)|ε ≥ ε0] = h(ε0) for all ε0 ≥ 0
and
lim
n→∞
E[h(ε)|ε ≤ ε0] = h(ε0) for all ε0 ≤ 0.
Since we assume that all consumers subscribe to one of the networks, we can use the
method of maximizing profits with respect to usage prices for making and receiving calls,
keeping market share constant, by adapting the fixed fee accordingly. It is not surprising
that the usage prices in a symmetric equilibrium candidate we find are the same as the ones
found by JLT (2004) under the assumption that consumer expectations vary with respect to
prices. For completeness, we include the analysis.
We start the analysis with the market for on-net calls. It is optimal for network i to
maximize the size of the pie for on-net calls. The first-order conditions with respect to pi
reads
d[U(pi, ri) + U˜(pi, ri)− cD(pi, ri)]
dpi
= 0,
while the one with respect to ri reads
d[U(pi, ri) + U˜(pi, ri)− cD(pi, ri)]
dri
= 0.
As the noise vanishes, these equations can be solved to yield pi = c/(1 + β) ≡ p∗ and
ri = cβ/(β + 1) = βp
∗ ≡ r∗. (This is the same exercise as determining the socially optimal
call and reception prices, as we did in the previous section.)
It is clear that there always exists an equilibrium with both off-net call and reception
charges equal to infinity, so that no off-net calls will be made. This is independent of the
level of the termination mark-up. Both networks then just offer efficient levels of on-net
traffic and compete for subscribers by means of the fixed fees. When consumers expect both
networks to be of equal size, then the equilibrium fixed fees will be equal to f + 1/(2σ).
Thus profits will be equal to 1/(4σ) for each firm. This type of equilibrium is pretty bad
in generating consumer surplus as only on-net calls will be made. Clearly, if there are more
than two networks this type of equilibrium is even worse.
We now solve for the optimal off-net call and reception charges in an equilibrium without
connectivity breakdown. When consumers expect market shares to be equal, to keep market
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shares constant at one half, network i should adjust fixed fee as follows:
Fi = Fj +
1
2
{
U(pˆi, rˆj) + U˜(pˆj, rˆi)− pˆiD(pˆi, rˆj)− rˆiD(pˆj, rˆi)
−U(pˆj, rˆi)− U˜(pˆi, rˆj) + pˆjD(pˆj, rˆi) + rˆjD(pˆi, rˆj)
}
.
The first-order derivative of profit with respect to pˆi reads
1
4
[
∂U(pˆi, rˆj)
∂pˆi
− (c+m− rˆj)∂D(pˆi, rˆj)
∂pˆi
− ∂U˜(pˆi, rˆj)
∂pˆi
],
which can be rewritten as
1
4
[1− F (rˆj − βpˆi)]q′(pˆi)
[
(1− β)pˆi − c−m+ rˆj −
∫ ε¯
rˆj−βpˆi
ε
f(ε)
1− F (rˆj − βpˆi)dε
]
Hence, the first-order condition is satisfied when
(1− β)pˆi − c−m+ rˆj = E(ε | ε ≥ rˆj − βpˆi).
Note that the second-order derivative of the profit function with respect to pˆi, evaluated
at the solution of the first-order condition, equals
∂2pii
∂pˆ2i
=
1
4
[1−F (rˆj−βpˆi)]q′(pˆi)(1−β)−1
4
q′(pˆi)βf(rˆj−βpˆi)
(
1−
∫ ε¯
rˆj−βpˆi
ε
f(ε)
1− F (rˆj − βpˆi)dε
)
.
The first-order derivative of pi with respect to rˆi, keeping market share constant at one
half, reads
1
4
[
∂U˜(pˆj, rˆi)
∂rˆi
+ (pˆj +m)
∂D(pˆj, rˆi)
∂rˆi
− ∂U(pˆj, rˆi)
∂rˆi
].
This can be rewritten as
1
4
[
∫ rˆi−βpˆj
ε
1
β
[rˆi + pˆj +m− rˆi − ε
β
]q′(
rˆi − ε
β
)f(ε)dε],
which in turn is equal to
1
4β
F (rˆi − βpˆj)E((rˆi + pˆj +m− rˆi − ε
β
)q′(
rˆi − ε
β
) | ε ≤ rˆi − βpˆj).
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Note that the second-order derivative of the profit function with respect to rˆi, evaluated
at the solution of the first-order condition, equals
∂2pii
∂rˆ2i
=
1
4β
(rˆi +m)q
′(pˆj)f(rˆi − βpˆj)
+
1
4β
∫ rˆi−βpˆj
ε
[
(1− 1/β)q′( rˆi − ε
β
) + (rˆi + pˆj +m− rˆi − ε
β
)q′′(
rˆi − ε
β
)
1
β
]
f(ε)dε.
Let F (n) represent a series of noise distributions that is regular according our definition.
Let (pˆ(n), rˆ(n)) denote the corresponding symmetric equilibrium candidate usage prices. By
taking a suitable subsequence one may assume that either rˆn − βpˆn ≤ 0 for all n or that
rˆn − βpˆn ≥ 0 for all n.
Consider the first case. Then in the limit, as noise vanishes, the limit point (pˆ, rˆ) must
satisfy rˆ − βpˆ ≤ 0 and
0 = (1− β)pˆ− c−m+ rˆ (19)
0 = rˆ +m (20)
so that rˆ = −m and pˆ = (c+ 2m)/(1− β). The condition rˆ− βpˆ ≤ 0 is satisfied if and only
if m ≥ −βc/(1 + β). Note that these symmetric candidate equilibrium usage prices were
reported in JLT (2004). However, they did not verify whether the second-order condition
is satisfied and whether the equilibrium candidate is indeed an equilibrium. We show that,
under some additional assumptions, these equilibrium candidates are indeed equilibria.
Lemma 5 Suppose that rˆ − βpˆ < 0 and that q(p) is linear. Furthermore, assume that
the noise distributions are normal with zero mean and variance σ2. Then the second-order
conditions are satisfied in the equilibrium candidate of the noisy game as σ ↓ 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Consider the second case next. Then in the limit, as noise vanishes, the limit point (pˆ, rˆ)
must satisfy rˆ − βpˆ ≥ 0 and
0 = pˆ− c−m (21)
0 = rˆ(1− 1/β) + pˆ+m (22)
so that pˆ = c + m and rˆ = β(c + 2m)/(1− β). The condition rˆ − βpˆ ≥ 0 is satisfied if and
only if m ≥ −βc/(1 + β). JLT (2004) discard this candidate equilibrium on the ground of
second-order considerations.
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Proposition 6 As the noise vanishes, for m < −βc/(1 +β) the only symmetric equilibrium
has connectivity breakdown. The unique symmetric equilibrium candidate without connectiv-
ity breakdown has
(i) If m ≥ 0,
p =
c
1 + β
, r =
βc
1 + β
, pˆ =
c+m
1− β , rˆ = 0, F = f +
1
2σ
.
(ii) If −βc/(1 + β) ≤ m < 0,
p =
c
1 + β
, r =
βc
1 + β
, pˆ =
c+ 2m
1− β , rˆ = −m,F = f +
1
2σ
.
Equilibrium profit per firm is given by
pi∗ =
1
4σ
+
1
4
(pˆ+ rˆ − c)q(pˆ).
Proof. We already showed the result for the variable prices in the text. We just need to
calculate the equilibrium fixed fees. Given the variable prices, firms make no profits from
on-net calls and each firm i thus solves
max
Fi
αi [Fi − f + (1− αi)(pˆ+ rˆ − c)q(pˆ)] .
Because expectations are passive, ∂αi/∂Fi = −σ so that the first-order condition reads
−σ [Fi − f + (1− 2αi)(pˆ+ rˆ − c)q(pˆ)] + 1/2 = 0.
At a symmetric equilibrium (with αi = 1/2), we thus have
−σ(F − f) + 1
2
= 0,
from which the result follows.
Note that even though the termination charge affects the price for making and receiving
off-net calls, the equilibrium fixed fee is independent of m. The reason is that consumers
with passive expectations expect each firm to obtain half of the market, even when firms
would charge different fixed fees. As consumers expect to get the same surplus from each
network, the equilibrium fixed fee is as in the standard Hotelling model without network
effects. Thus, there exists no waterbed effect on subscription or, in other words, there is no
pass-through of costs into retail prices. This is due to the fact that we consider a symmetric
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duopoly. With asymmetric firms or symmetric oligopolies a partial waterbed effect can be
shown to exist.
For a non-negative m, firms will not charge the reception of off-net calls, in which case
the socially efficient termination mark-up would be m = −2βc/(1 + β). Nevertheless, this
level of termination mark-up would lead them to charge users for receiving off-net calls. So
in terms of social welfare, the best m with rˆ = 0 is m = 0. But, overall m = −βc/(1 + β) is
the socially efficient termination mark-up as it leads automatically to the RPP regime with
the efficient volume.28 For this level of termination discount, however, firms will not make
profit from off-net traffic: pˆ + rˆ − c = 0. This may induce them to agree to adopt a CPP
regime in which case they will increase their profits.29
It is worthwhile to remark that when termination charge is above cost (m ≥ 0) it does
not really matter whether firms use the RPP or the CPP regime. Prices for off-net calls are
identical and profits and consumer surplus are exactly the same under both regimes. Only
when termination charge is below cost there are differences. First, under RPP there exist
equilibria with connectivity breakdown. Focussing on the equilibria without connectivity
breakdown, we notice that not only pˆRPP < pˆCPP , but even pˆRPP + rˆRPP < pˆCPP . Hence
when termination charge is below cost, consumers make more or longer calls and pay less,
even when one accounts for the fact that then consumers pay for receiving calls as well. This
is consistent with the finding of Littlechild (2006) that RPP regimes are correlated with lower
average revenues (per minute) as well as higher average usage (measured by call minutes).
This not so surprising if one takes into account that CPP regimes are observed in countries
with high termination charges while RPP regimes are often observed in countries with low
termination charges. However, our result suggests that this is even so when comparing RPP
and CPP regimes with similar termination charges.
It is not clear whether firms will have more profit under the CPP or the RPP regime
if allowed to set freely the termination mark-up. Next we address this issue under the
assumption of constant elasticity call demand.
28For a non-negative m, firms will compete under the CPP regime, in which case the socially efficient
termination mark-up would be m = −2βc/(1 + β). However, this level of termination mark-up would lead
them to use the RPP regime. So in terms of social welfare, the best m under the CPP regime is m = 0.
Nonetheless, overall m = −βc/(1 + β) is the socially efficient termination mark-up as it leads automatically
to the RPP regime with the efficient volume.
29Under passive expectations, call externalities and the CPP regime, the equilibrium profit is pi∗ = 14σ +
1
4 [(p̂
∗ − c)q(p̂∗)− (p∗ − c)q(p∗)] with p̂∗ = c+m1−β and p∗ = c1+β (see Hurkens and Lo´pez, 2010). Thus,
pi∗ > 14σ .
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4.1 Constant elasticity call demand
In order to get some insights about the termination charges that maximize industry profit, we
will assume throughout the rest of the section that call demand has constant elasticity. That
is, we will assume that q(p) = p−η where η > 1. The termination charge that maximizes
industry profit in this case depends on the strength of the call externality β. When the
call externality is relatively weak, firms prefer a termination charge above cost (m > 0)
that will allow them to set the price for making an off-net call equal to the monopoly
price pM = arg max(p− c)q(p). For strong call externalities, however, firms prefer to have a
termination discount (m < 0) that will allow them to charge for receiving calls. The resulting
off-net call price will be below the monopoly price but the firms will earn above monopoly
profits (for off-net calls) because of the positive reception charge. The total price charged
for a call will also be below the monopoly price.
Proposition 7 Suppose that q(p) = p−η where η > 1. Then there exists a critical value
β¯ ∈ ( 1
2η−1 ,
1
η
) such that
(i) for β < β¯, the termination mark-up that maximizes industry profit equals
m = (1− β)pM − c > 0.
Off-net calls are then charged at monopoly price pM and there is no reception charge
for receiving off-net calls.
(ii) for β > β¯, the termination mark-up that maximizes industry profit equals
m =
c(2ηβ − β − 1)
2(1 + β)(1− η) .
The resulting prices then satisfy pˆ < pM and pˆ+ rˆ < pM .
Proof. If the optimal termination mark-up is positive, it must be equal to m+(β) = (1 −
β)pM − c, as this makes the off-net call price equal to the monopoly price pM . Of course,
m+(β) is only positive if β is small enough. In fact, pM = −ηc/(1 − η) so that a necessary
condition for m+(β) > 0 is that β < 1/η.
If the optimal termination mark-up is negative, it must be that m−(β) = arg max(pˆ +
rˆ − c)q(pˆ). It is straightforward to show that
m−(β) =
c(2ηβ − β − 1)
2(1 + β)(1− η) .
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A necessary condition for m−(β) < 0 is that β > 1/(2η − 1).
The critical value β¯ is such that the profit obtained from termination mark-up equal to
m−(β¯) is exactly equal to the one obtained from m+(β¯), that is, equal to monopoly profit.
Straightforward calculations show that β¯ = 21/η − 1.
5 Concluding remarks
We have analyzed how termination charges affect retail price competition when firms can
charge consumers for receiving calls. Compared to earlier literature on this topic we assume
that consumers form expectations about network sizes in a passive, but ex-post rational
way. Moreover, we restrict reception charges to be non-negative. When firms cannot set
different prices for on-net and off-net traffic, expectations over network sizes do not matter
and we obtain the standard profit neutrality result in this case. Firms will set a positive
reception charge only if termination charge is below termination cost. In this sense we
confirm European operators’ warnings that further reductions in termination charges may
end the Calling Party Pays Regime. This is not necessarily a bad thing in terms of social
welfare. In fact, when receivers’ utility is random and thus receivers sometimes determine
the call volume, it is optimal to have strictly positive reception charges. This can only be
achieved by setting termination charge below cost. If receiver and caller derive the same
benefit, and if termination cost constitutes half of the total cost of a call, then Bill and Keep
leads to the socially optimal outcome. (DeGraba (2003) makes this point without formal
model.) In this case call and reception charges are the same. This may resemble the situation
in the US market pretty well. We also saw that if firms are restricted to set the same price
for incoming and outgoing traffic, an equilibrium exists with low usage prices. This may
also resemble the case of the US and other RPP countries where where so called buckets of
minutes of use are offered.
When firms are allowed to distinguish between on-net and off-net traffic, we already
know from Hurkens and Lo´pez (2010) that under the CPP regime the way expectations are
formed are very important. Firms typically will prefer high termination charges while below
or at cost termination charges are optimal from a social point of view. This is also true
for relatively low levels of receiver utility. Only for very strong levels of call externalities
firms would prefer below cost termination charges. The fact that most operators in Europe
strongly oppose cuts in termination rates suggests that call externalities are not believed to
be very strong.
Under the RPP regime we have shown that with termination based-price discrimination
firms will charge on-net reception (since this maximizes the surplus from on-net traffic when
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there is vanishing noise in the receiver’s utility). There always exist equilibria in which
off-net traffic is choked by high call and or reception charges. However, for a wide range
of parameters there also exist equilibria in which there is no connectivity breakdown. Our
analysis focusses on these equilibria. For positive termination mark-ups there is no reception
charge andour results on profits and welfare are as in the case where a CPP regime is used.
That is, when the call externality is not too strong, firm see their profits reduced when
termination charges are reduced toward cost. However, when termination charges are reduced
below cost, things change. Namely, then firms start charging for reception (.e., RPP is used).
Profits first increase and then decrease as termination charge is further reduced. Depending
on the strength of the call externality the profit of firms with below cost termination charges
under an RPP regime may be higher than those obtained under a CPP regime with high
termination charges.
Apart from the difference between Europe and the US in termination rates and the
regimes used, there is the matter of penetration, which is much higher in Europe. In order
to address how penetration rates are related to termination rates and pay regimes, we need
to allow for elastic subscription demand. We plan to do so in the near future.
APPENDIX
We introduce some notation and derive some useful derivatives.
Define
Dij = D(pi, rj) = [1− F (rj − βpi)]q(pi) +
∫ rj−βpi
ε
q(
rj − ε
β
)fε)dε,
Uij = U(pi, rj) = [1− F (rj − βpi)]u(q(pi))
+
∫ rj−βpi
ε
u(q(
rj − ε
β
))f(ε)dε,
and
U˜ij = U˜(pi, rj) =
∫ ε¯
rj−βpi
[βu(q(pi)) + εq(pi)]f(ε)dε
+
∫ rj−βpi
ε
[βu(q(
rj − ε
β
)) + εq(
rj − ε
β
)]f(ε)dε.
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Then,
∂Dij
∂pi
= [1− F (rj − βpi)]q′(pi)
and
∂Dij
∂rj
=
∫ rj−βpi
ε
1
β
q′(
rj − ε
β
)f(ε)dε.
Further,
∂Uij
∂pi
= [1− F (rj − βpi)]piq′(pi) = pi∂Dij
∂pi
.
and
∂Uij
∂rj
=
∫ rj−βpi
ε
1
β
rj − ε
β
q′(
rj − ε
β
)f(ε)dε.
Finally,
∂U˜ij
∂pi
=
∫ ε¯
rj−βpi
(βpi + ε)q
′(pi)f(ε)dε
and
∂U˜ij
∂rj
=
∫ rj−βpi
ε
rjq
′(
rj − ε
β
)
1
β
f(ε)dε = rj
∂Dij
∂rj
.
Proof of Proposition 1. Maximizing i’s profit with respect to pi, while adjusting the fee
Fi so as to maintain market share, yields the following first-order condition:
αi
[−αic+ αjm+ (αi + βj)pi + βipj] q′(piβ ) 1β = 0.
Since at a symmetric equilibrium αi = βi =
1
2
, the above expression leads to:
p1 = p2 = p
∗ ≡ c−m
3
.
Therefore, p∗ > 0 if c > m. For given equilibrium prices pi = pj = p∗, network i’s profit is
equal to:
pii = αi [(2p
∗ − c)D(p∗, p∗) + Fi − f ] ,
with αi =
1
2
+ σ
(
ϕi(βi, p
∗, p∗)− Fi − ϕj(βj, p∗, p∗) + Fj
)
. Differentiating with respect to
the subscription fee Fi yields, at a symmetric equilibrium:
∂pii
∂Fi
∣∣∣∣
F1=F2=F,p1=p2=p∗
= −σ [(2p∗ − c)D(p∗, p∗) + F − f ] + 1
2
.
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Therefore, the equilibrium fixed fee F ∗ is given by
F ∗ = f +
1
2σ
− (2p∗ − c)D(p∗, p∗).
Second-order conditions are satisfied at the candidate equilibrium. Finally, substituting F ∗
and p∗ into (10), we obtain pi1 = pi2 = 1/4σ.
Proof of Lemma 5. The second-order derivative of profits with respect to pˆi converges
to 1
4
q′(pˆ)(1 − β) < 0. Hence, for low levels of noise the second-order condition is satisfied.
The second-order derivative of profits with respect to rˆi reads, in this case
∂2pii
∂rˆ2i
=
q′(pˆ)F (rˆi − βpˆj)
4β
(rˆi +m)
f(rˆi − βpˆj)
F (rˆi − βpˆj) +
∫ rˆi−βpˆj
ε
(1− 1/β) f(ε)
F (rˆi − βpˆj)dε.
Hence the sign of the second-order derivative is the sign of
−
{
(rˆi +m)
f(rˆi − βpˆj)
F (rˆi − βpˆj) + 1− 1/β
}
.
To show that this sign is negative, we now use that the noise distributions are normal with
variance σ2. We denote the CDF and PDF of these distributions by Fσ and fσ, respectively.
Let rˆi(σ) denote the solution of the first-order condition when the noise distribution has
variance σ2. Note that
ri(σ) +m = −E(pˆj + ε− rˆi(σ)
β
|ε ≤ rˆi(σ)− βpˆj) > 0.
Hence, for σ > 0 small enough we have that r′(σ) ≥ 0. Note that the first-order condition
can be written as
(rˆi(σ) +m)Fσ(rˆi(σ)− βpˆj) = −
∫ rˆi(σ)−βpˆj
ε
(pˆj +
ε− rˆi(σ)
β
)fσ(ε)dε.
Taking the total derivative with respect to σ of the above expression, we find
rˆi′(σ)Fσ(rˆi(σ)− βpˆj) + (rˆi(σ) +m)fσ(rˆi(σ)− βpˆj)rˆi′(σ) =
−
∫ rˆi(σ)−βpˆj
ε
[−rˆ′i(σ)
β
fσ(ε) + (pˆj +
ε− rˆi(σ)
β
)
∂fσ(ε)
∂σ
]
dε.
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Dividing both sides by Fσ(rˆi(σ)− βpˆj), and using that
∂fσ(ε)
∂σ
= fσ(ε)
ε2 − σ2
σ3
,
we find after rearranging that
rˆ′i(σ)
{
1− 1
β
+
(rˆi(σ) +m)fσ(rˆi(σ)− βpˆj)
Fσ(rˆi(σ)− βpˆj)
}
= −E
[
(pˆj +
ε− rˆi(σ)
β
)
ε2 − σ2
σ3
|ε ≤ rˆi(σ)− βpˆj
]
,
For σ small enough the right-hand side of this equation is strictly positive. Since rˆ′i(σ) ≥ 0,
it must be that the term between curly brackets is strictly positive. This exactly implies
that the sign of the second-order derivative is strictly negative.
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